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Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat. By Geoffrey Hayes
and Mark Sedra, editors. Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-1-55458-001-8. Notes.
Bibliography. Charts. Index. Pp. xxxiv, 309. Paper, $29.95.
As this review is being written, President Obama has just concluded a
meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper at which one
of the primary topics of discussion was the “deteriorating situation” in
Afghanistan. Obama recently ordered another 17,000 U.S. troops to that
troubled nation, and while Harper remains committed to his country’s
pledge to help rebuild Afghanistan, Canada looks to withdraw its nearly
3000 troops by 2011. It remains to be seen whether Afghans can regain
control of their country’s security situation, but given the increasing
instability and a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda efforts, it seems likely
that additional U.S. troops will be needed to prevail on what Obama has
termed the main front in the war on terrorism. If nothing else, Canada’s
economic assistance will be vital, but the current uncertain conditions
highlight the importance of understanding why we are facing a “transition
under threat,” as the editors have aptly subtitled this timely volume.
Hayes and Sedra have done good service in bringing together in one
volume a collection of eleven papers presented in Waterloo, Canada
in December 2006, at a workshop sponsored by the Centre for
International Governance Innovation and co-organized by the Laurier
Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies. The collected
essays address three distinct, yet interrelated, aspects of Afghanistan’s
transition from war to peace and are organized under the headings of
“Political Transition,” “Economic Transition,” and “Security Transition.”
A final section of three essays under the category of “The Canadian Case,”
specifically examines Canada’s experience in Afghanistan. Despite the
recent attention on the state of Afghan affairs, it was apparent to these
scholars and other experts even in 2006 that the situation there was yet
so uncertain as to give rise to questions about whether efforts to bring
stability were “gaining ground or were on the verge of ‘strategic f ailure’ ”
(p. vii). A sense of the authors’ collective foreboding that the latter
situation was the most likely outcome provides a somber background for
these essays.
An insightful look at the legacy of 2001’s Bonn conference and r esultant
agreement provide the foundation for a discussion of the political
transition. In “Looking Back at the Bonn Process,” William Maley cites
two significant factors as contributing to the failure to deliver fully on
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the promises of Bonn. One is Pakistan’s penchant for interference in
Afghan affairs, and the other is the relegation of Afghanistan to a back
seat in favor of Iraq, to which resources and attention have been largely
diverted. Maley further cites as critical the initial decision not to expand
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul, a
situation that contributed significantly to disorder in outlying areas of
the country.
In “Afghanistan: The Challenge of State Building,” former Afghan
Interior Minister Ali A. Jalali also blames the legacy of corruption in his
country for the failure to provide a suitable foundation for the growth of
democracy. The Afghan state clearly was unable to provide the most basic
public services, most notably, security. Jonathan Goodhand rounds out
the discussion of the political transition with a provocative look at how
poppy production plays a central role in security affairs, asserting that
drug policies are actually “undermining higher policy goals related to
security and governance” (74). Goodhand echoes Jalali’s lament over the
lack of focus on strengthening “core state institutions,” and in a plea
to reconsider intensive eradication efforts he concludes that “rather
than criminalizing war economies there is a need to think more
carefully about how to harness the energies of war in order to pay for
peace” (77).
Perhaps of most interest to the readers of this review will be the s ection
of the book dealing with the security transition. Antonio Giustozzi’s
“The Neo-Taliban Insurgency: From Village Islam to International
Jihad,” insightfully contends that a new Taliban s trategy has emerged
that emphasizes building support among Muslim n
 ations and
stretching Western capabilities by creating multiple areas of u
 nrest
around the world. Rather than turning Westerners’ public o
 pinion
against their countries’ military efforts, Neo-Taliban focus is on
winning M
 uslim public opinion and thereby strengthening sources of
funding and volunteers. Inside Afghanistan, that means first removing
pro-government forces from the fight, thus promoting the image from
that point that the Taliban is waging a war against foreign aggressors.
In Mark Sedra’s “Security Sector Reform and State Building in
Afghanistan,” the author reflects on the state of security sector reform
(SSR), noting that the process of remaking Afghanistan’s state security
architecture “continues to be characterized by short-termism” (212) and
a failure to balance long and short-term goals. Moreover, he asserts,
pumping funds into unreformed state institutions still ripe for corruption
will serve only to further alienate Afghans victimized by that corruption.
Sedra recommends adoption of “a holistic approach that aims to change
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the culture and ethos of the system,” (213) and hopes for a continuation
of the momentum in placing SSR efforts on the right course for success.
Afghan Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani’s article,
“Insecurity along the Durand Line,” provides an historical primer
describing the creation of Afghanistan’s border first with British India
and then with the independent state of Pakistan, tracing the process by
which the latter developed relations with the United States by p
 ortraying
itself as the bulwark against Soviet influence in the region and by
maintaining influence in Afghanistan. While interesting in its portrayal
of Afghanistan’s views on the historical relations between that country
and Pakistan, Haqqani’s version, though useful, seems decidedly partial
in fixing blame. He contends that Pakistan’s historical fears of insecurity
on its borders still influence Afghanistan’s external relations and must
be addressed by the international community before stable and cordial
relations can exist between the two neighbors.
In all, this fine collection of essays provides a useful look at where
we have been and, unfortunately, where we still need to go in efforts
to restore the security of Afghanistan. The book will be of interest to
scholars and strategic security practitioners alike.
Edward J. Hagerty is the provost at Henley-Putnam University.
Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American
National Security. By Richard K. Betts. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-231-13889-5.
Notes. Index. Pp. xiv, 241. $21.50.
We are all aware that the events of September 11, 2001 brought intense
focus on our nation’s Intelligence Community (IC), with an enormous
variety of corrections, reorganizations, and improvements proposed,
many of which were implemented. At the same time allegations of
serious error, incorrect reporting, and excessive compartmentation
drew f ront-page headlines in U.S. newspapers and television news
programs. In Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American
National Security, Richard Betts explores these issues and looks at the
changes that have resulted, while providing significant background and
interesting evaluations of the products of those changes. He also offers
his perspective of possible solutions to problems, including strategies to
enhance the effectiveness of intelligence analysis and reporting.
While the intelligence business is itself based on a history of many
centuries—even the ancient Romans and Greeks used intelligence to
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their advantage and sometimes to their disadvantage—Betts focuses on
the events of the past several decades to illustrate his points, generally
from World War II to the present day. In this respect the book could
be considered a commentary, or perhaps a set of proposed solutions to
complex problems that are faced in today’s world. He does this based
on a distinctive association with the IC. Currently he is Director of the
Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia
University, and senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. Betts is
also the author of several books on military strategy and foreign policy.
He has served on staffs of the Senate Intelligence Committee (the Church
committee) and National Security Council in the 1970s, as a consultant
to the National Intelligence Council and the Central Intelligence Agency
in the 1980s, on advisory panels for the Director of Central Intelligence
in the 1990s, and on the National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer
commission) in 1999–2000.
Certainly this book is not unique in the field of reviews of our current
IC. The thirty-four pages of notes with footnoted references are enough
to demonstrate the number of publications on this subject. Indeed,
these references are really a treasure trove of materials pertinent to this
complex topic, and they provide the basis for a thorough evaluation of
many of the concepts. Betts draws from this vast set of publications in
order to provide his own perspective regarding the intelligence processes
and structure.
Betts skillfully uses his academic experience in combination with his
on-the-job experience in order to define many of the problems the
IC has faced in the past and those that continue to be of fundamental
importance. He clearly points out that public criticism of the IC is often
based on limited or even incorrect information. Many successes go
quietly into the unknown, while failures most often become public. He
also points out that sometimes it is difficult to clearly determine the
degree of success of an operation, particularly if it preempts an enemy
action. For example, if we learn through intelligence that an enemy action
is forthcoming we might implement a defensive measure. If the enemy
in turn realizes that a defensive measure exists and does not p
 ursue the
action, it is difficult to recognize the degree of success. Similarly, if there
is insufficient real proof that an enemy action might take place, but the
implementation of an appropriate defense is too expensive or complex
based on the evidence available, a lack of action on our part would reflect
badly on the intelligence process if the enemy action actually occurred.
As noted on the book jacket, author unknown, “Betts argues that when
it comes to intelligence, citizens and politicians should focus less on
consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between
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conflicting requirements. He also emphasizes the substantial success of
the intelligence community, despite its well-publicized blunders, and
highlights elements of the intelligence process that need preservation and
protection.”
I must admit that when I read of his activities with the Church
commission, which was extremely critical of the Intelligence Community
in the 1970s, his academic experience and work with the B
 rookings
Institution, both generally liberal environments, I did not expect to
find supportable conclusions. In fact I found that he clearly e xpressed
real problems in both the intelligence and political worlds, and
made proposals that can positively affect not only the collection and
reporting of intelligence, but the evaluation and analysis followed by
the determination of appropriate actions based on the intelligence.
Anyone involved in final intelligence product analysis or i mplementation
of responses to threats should read this book and consider using the
approaches offered by Richard Betts.
Ed Urie is a member of the Henley-Putnam University faculty and is
also an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He is a retired
U.S. Army Intelligence Officer and a veteran of CIA and NSA.
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